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1. INTRODUCTION 
For three years the society globally and all the fields of human life have been 
and are still affected by the global structural crisis of dominant system (capitalism). 
This crisis is considered to be one of the biggest and most important that has ever 
been within capitalism. A procedure inherent to the system: the capitalism by itself 
creates crises which it makes efforts to overcome with even harder measures and 
structural changes. 
Current crisis has affected so much human life that now every plan, in all the 
fields and sectors, takes it, its consequences and ways to recover into account. It 
started in 2006 in USA and spread globally affecting mainly global economy which 
is characterized by the structural changes in all the fields of people’s lives, the 
emerge and focus on financial sector and the increase of social and spatial 
inequalities (see Harvey, 2001), even before crisis beginning. 
Crisis consequences are obvious in all the fields: dramatic increase of 
unemployment, decline in wages, negative change of growth, higher borrowings 
from states which had already huge deficits resulting in a huge increase of debts. 
These results had consequences in all the aspects of social life: in the macro level 
and especially the state economies, in the micro level, i.e. the individual economies 
of the households, in poverty level, in level of well being, in the distribution of 
wealth and in the level of inequalities, in the environment. 
The way and the size of the effects in each state were different depending on 
many factors (the development level of the state, dependence in one sector, i.e. 
specialization and mainly in financial one, and previous applied policies). Especially 
in Greece, the first target-victim-test-state of the international markets, crisis 
consequences became even bigger due to the previous bad economic performance 
of the state. Big government deficits and debts and their continuous increase 
affected negatively the situation and were affected negatively by crisis. These, 
already existing before 2008, problems came of the neoliberal policies (and the way) 
that were applied by Greek governments in the last 15 years: huge state loans, 
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European Union’s (EU) regulations and big tax evasion of the rich individuals and 
firms. 
In front of this situation the states had to react (financial measures, 
decentralization, and governance). The initial question “in favor of whom the 
policies will be, of people or of banks?” was almost immediately answered by 
measures and structural changes which were announced and applied and they 
continue even today, 36 months after crisis’ beginning. This reaction occurred, in 
international level, with the meeting of the 20 most powerful economies of the 
world (G20) and in national level with the decisions that each government made.  
In Greece, until now, the measures and the state policies could be divided in two 
periods: the first from August 2008, that the first effects appeared, to May 2010 and 
the second from May 2010 that Greece was introduced in the supportive 
mechanism of both IMF and EU (which finally is stabilized and spread to Ireland 
and Portugal) until today that Greek debt was restructured after the decision of EU 
in 26th October 2011. 
However, the most crucial question occurs regarding the nature of these 
policies: which is their goal? Who do they aim to help and protect? The states acted 
in a way that increased the welfare state or reduced it? Did these policies decline the 
inequalities that increased due to crisis or they stabilized-increased them in the 
background and the excuse of crisis, in order to ensure the reproduction of 
capitalism? These policies had focused on the human and the society or on the 
capital, the banks and their safety? Finally, there is need to analyze and to evaluate 
the results of these policies for the achievement or not of their goals. 
This paper examines in an abstract way (it could not be different in a paper) 
crisis, its beginning, its characteristics and its consequences in both international 
and Greek level. After this, they are examined the ways that the Greek State reacted 
and which policies were selected in order to face crisis. Special interest is given to 
the question of who finally benefited. 
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2. THE CURRENT GLOBALIZED ECONOMY 
From the late 1980s we are in a transition period from local - national 
economic systems to a globalized economy which has new and different 
characteristics. Scholars in favor of globalized economy argued that the 
international economics hold that freeing of trade and capital flows, in an integrated 
world economy, leads to a more efficient allocation of the world’s scarce resources 
(see Kapstein, 2000: 362). The above economic model generates greater output and 
consumption compared to protectionism.  
Some researchers (see Hall, 1993; Gordon, 1999) define globalization as a 
more intensive internationalization of economic activities. The integration between 
the local systems is achieved through financial and labor mobility, free trade, 
foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration and the spread of technology and 
innovation. Others (see Castells, 1993; Sassen, 1996) assert that globalization 
actually means something deeper than internationalization. Globalization, according 
to them, is related to an economy that works as a single unit at a global scale. It is 
an economy where capital and financial flows, labor and community markets, 
information, management and organization are not only globalized but they are 
fully interdependent throughout the world.  
Globalization, in economic terms, is characterized by increasing complexity 
and density of global supply chains, internationalization of finance by opening 
national borders in the process of capitalist integrations like EU which was verified 
by Maastricht treaty (see Michael-Matsas, 2010) and, mainly, high accumulation of 
wealth in large multinational corporations and elites who benefit from them (see 
Harvey, 2001).  
These important changes have been processed by national policies which 
support and are promoted by dominant school of thought, neoliberalism (see 
Harvey, 2010), in a relationship of interaction and inter-determination. Under 
neoliberal policies the poor are considered to be helped not by welfare and labor 
policies but instead by increased investment in high-technology jobs that would 
result in higher productivity and wages (see Harvey, 2005). 
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It is a fact that since 1990 the inequalities among states (in high level of 
administration and structure) have declined (see Cox, 2008). However, this reduce 
in global inequalities, which is attributable largely to growth of newly industrializing 
Asian economies, has taken place in the same period that conditions have worsened 
in the majority of the parts of world (see Castells, 1993). Furthermore, inequalities 
among regions have increased (see Rodriguez-Andres and Crescenzi, 2008).  
Following and implementing neoliberal policies, rich (territories, corporations and 
individuals) have become richer and poor have become poorer (see Harvey, 2005). 
So, spatial and social inequalities remain high and, in many cases, increased. Other 
results are that multinational companies are the dominant players in the market and 
the networks of global cities have become the dominant reference for the firms (see 
Sassen, 1996). 
3. ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008 
Almost 80 years have passed from the big crash in USA followed by the “New 
Deal” (introduced by Roosevelt) and the “Large Amelioration”, and a new, bigger 
and more important crisis has appeared in the globalized economy that was 
described above.        
 
3.1 Crises - a situation inherent to capitalism 
According to the neoliberal school of thought this crisis is the most important 
ever and largely affected and still affects all the states, both developed and 
developing through trade and finance (see Subramanian and Williamson, 2009). 
Perhaps, some handful states which are not market integrated and governments 
receive the most of the revenues have not been affected so much. However, there 
are doubts whether it is more beneficiary to exist in an open economy where the 
borrowing can be made internationally or in a closed rigid economy (see Corsetti 
and Roubini, 1997).  
According to Acemoglu (2009) there are two paths in order to identify how 
crisis emerges. He claims that the first is the Rajan hypothesis which finally led to 
crisis of 2008 beginning form the huge increase of technological development 
which led to increase inequality. The political responses to this divergence resulted 
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in financial crisis. On the other hand the alternative hypothesis suggests that 
current politics created the state of finance which resulted in increasing the 
inequality and emerge of financial crisis. 
The reasons of the crisis, according to neoliberal school of thought, are many 
but the as the most important could be considered the very large banks, the lack of 
market regulation and the policies with very expansionary character (see 
Subramanian and Williamson, 2009; Rogoff, 2010). Especially the lack of market 
regulating policies is something that happened due to financial industry which 
dominated politics and policies over governments through the much bigger trust of 
governments in the companies than the individuals (see Acemoglu, 2009). Also the 
uncontrolled subsidies to housing sector in states like USA accelerated crisis emerge 
while in states with regulation like France and Germany it was prevented. 
Furthermore, there were not so realistic ways for incorporation of financial 
market frictions into the economical models of monetary policy’s analysis and there 
was big care of credit markets (see Rogoff, 2010). Also, the countercyclical fiscal 
policies which were adopted accelerated crisis emerge. Finally, the high capital 
inflows resulted in debt crisis and (in this crisis) the “sub-prime debt sells at steep 
discount relative to the expected value of future repayments” (see Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008). 
The results of crisis was the bail out of key financial key players, the no-bail 
out of low income house owners and the political resistance to extension of 
unemployment benefits (see Acemoglu, 2009). But is this the reality? Did crisis 
emerge due to the failure of the market and market deregulation or deficient 
regulation of market? 
On contrary, Marxist school of thought suggests that this crisis is one of the 
crises that are inherent of capitalism (see Shaikh, 2011) and a result of the circuit of 
capital (see Marx and Engels, 1885/1992: 109-199) which has three stages-forms of 
capital in all the sectors (finance, industry and commerce):  
1. Money (its owner buys labor power, commodities and means of production). 
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2. Commodity (surplus value is the unpaid labor time which is embodied in the 
outputs and which is produced by the use of the three inputs and by the provision 
of the workers of much higher value than the return of the owner to them as 
wages, selling their labor power). 
3. Productive (expansion by the owners of the total value of commodities in order 
to increase the surplus). 
Each one of circuits occurs as a movement of the “reproduction process of the 
total social capital” (see Marx and Engels, 1885/1992: 180). This whole procedure 
is finally resulting in increasing the levels of capital accumulation in only some 
people, the capitalists, and in the increasing rate of their profits. 
However, this process is not stable and has many fluctuations: the expansion of 
capitalist production and its operations is proceeding in an unplanned and 
voracious way aiming continuously in the increase of profit rate.  So, sometimes 
there is huge stock remained unsold, a situation which puts pressure on prices and 
profits. Suddenly, the exploitation of labor is becoming less and less profitable, 
forcing capitalists to borrow for maintaining their solvency and for increasing the 
efficiency of the production process. Some others make efforts to sustain the 
accumulation of capital using more financial activities than productive ones (see 
Marx, 1885/1992). 
This situation, finally, generates the inherent to capitalism, crises when the 
profit rates are declining (or at least are not increasing), a process (increasing profit 
rates) that is necessary for the reproduction of the system. These periods are 
characterized by “moderate activity, over-production, crisis and stagnation” (see 
Marx, 1867/ 1990: 580). This happens exactly due to the nature of capitalist mode 
of production: the inherent process of capitalism is to generate large amounts of 
commodities always more than the limits and the needs of the market, resulting, 
thus, in crises, i.e. overproduction and over-accumulation (see Marx, 1862/1954: 
393-407). So, this is the way that capitalist crises, including this of 2008, begin. 
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In an effort to recover the profit rate in regular levels (increasing) and in order the 
system to be reproduced and the crises to be faced, states and owners reduce 
wages, dismiss employees and increase the working flexibility. 
 
3.2 The characteristics of current crisis 
Current crisis is a strong, long and deep crisis. It is shown by the fact that even 
today, after almost five years since its beginning, many states are still in recession. 
The data quoted in the following sections indicate the situation. In contrast with the 
previous episodes like Southeastern Asia in 1997 (see Wade, 1998), Mexico in 2000 
(see McKenzie, 2003) and Argentina in 2002 (see Fields and Puerta, 2010), current 
crisis burst out in the heart of the developed world, in USA and EU. It affects all 
the sectors, branches and companies but especially financial sector and the symbols 
of free market’s superiority and domination (stock markets, investment banks and 
insurance companies). It has been the outcome of repeated and giant restructuring 
of the main characteristics of the current global economy and free market. 
This crisis, originated from housing sector in USA (see Dadkah, 2009: 241-
243), affected initially the financial and credit system. It is a crisis of financial capital 
globalization (see Michael-Matsas, 2010). But which was the way in financial terms? 
There has been a long period of very low interest rates which resulted in growth by 
over-sales of mortgages which were subprime to the low income household in 
USA. These loans were created by securitization through generating bonds based 
on the expected mortgage payments (see Radice, 2011).  
The risk was considered to be very low and it could “disappear” through credit 
default swaps (CDS, see below). In the period before crisis, house prices in real 
estate market were stabilized. In the same period the CDS of the mortgages 
increased due to the interest rates rise (see O’ Hara, 2009). This revealed that there 
has been a great underestimation regarding the risk to the value of mortgage-backed 
securities. The CDS more increase obligated the banks and the insurance 
corporations to face great financial disaster and losses. The lending transactions 
spread to all over the world and eventually from housing sector of USA the crisis 
had already expanded in all the sectors all over the world. It has the characteristics 
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of a crisis of capital hyper - accumulation (see Mandel, 1985) and has seriously 
affected all aspects of socioeconomic life in the West World.  
So, it is more obvious than ever that this crisis occurred by the voracious and 
unplanned way of hyper-production, by the efforts for taking even higher surplus 
value (in a different way today, i.e. selling more and more houses and mortgages) 
and by the excessive desire and necessity, in the same time, for increasing the profit 
rate (see Harvey, 2010: 44). The real crisis came of banks’ and mortgage companies’ 
lending “fake” loans to borrowers who did not have the financial means to 
undertake the costs of the loan, which in turn had been bundled in securities and 
sold around the world (bubble phenomenon). Furthermore, in 2006, the housing 
market experienced a downturn. Meanwhile, the world productive system had 
produced more goods which exceeded the available purchasing power. So the 
products could not be purchased on market prices. 
As a result the supply exceeded very much the demand at a level that caused a 
massive drop in orders and a significant reduction in current production (see 
Shaikh, 2011). This situation (the lack of sales, no stock depletion and the decline in 
current production) led to many of the crisis consequences, i.e. the dramatic steep 
drop in employment, earnings, and investment.  
Current crisis, although it relates with this of 1973, is not its simple sequel and 
extension (see O’ Hara, 2009). The crisis in 1973 was a crisis of a particular type of 
accumulation and reproduction of dominant relations (monopolistic capitalism, 
Keynesianism, Taylorism-Fordism). The current one is a crisis of a qualitatively 
different type of reproduction and accumulation also due to the change and reform 
of capitalism. Taking into account all the above analyses and characteristics of this 
crisis, it is considered that the crisis of 2008 is a crisis inherent to capitalism and a 
result of capital hyper-accumulation.  
 
3.3 The current situation of the national economies 
 Immediately this crisis of the financial sector spread to all the other sectors and 
since it started from the micro-individual level borrowing procedure it was 
transferred to national debts and banking sector. The situation, that almost all states 
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have at least a quite bad economic performance, takes place due to the policies that 
have been applied during the last 150 years by the dominant school of thought, the 
liberal-neoliberal one (see Harvey, 2010) and mainly nowadays due to current 
economic crisis which was caused by these policies. 
 However, this crisis has mainly developed into a sovereign-debt crisis. This was 
caused by the billion of euro spent by governments to bail out the banks and the 
financial companies that have heavily invested in “toxic” financial products in the 
virtual financial economy (see Radice, 2011).The huge sovereign debts and budget 
deficits emerged as a result of the neoliberal policies that are based on two pillars:  
1. States borrow huge loans from international markets in order to: finance 
projects that are profitable for large enterprises (and not to sustain the welfare state 
as it is mainly said) (see Harvey, 2010), to refinance older state debt, to make 
imports (see Bina and Yaghmaian, 1991), pay their huge internal (public) financial 
obligations (see Ruccio et al., 1991), enhance military and police control of the 
working class and to finance the local industrialization (see Cleaver, 1989).  
2. States don’t tax all the citizens equally and in most of times they do not tax the 
upper class and the large companies (see Cipolla, 1992; Byrne, 2001). They do not 
apply progressive taxation, thus they do not have revenues in order to decline the 
debts resulting in a great increase of their deficits. 
 This situation deteriorates by the “financial games” that take place in global 
financial market by transactions of invisible financial values (see Carchedi, 1997). 
After 1990 the Credit Default Swap (CDS) introduced in the global financial market 
as the indicator of how risky is to lend to a particular state. They are considered to 
be a “factor increasing systemic uncertainty” (see O’ Hara, 2009). It is a derivative 
contract between the buyer and the seller, in a relationship characterized by the 
payoff of the seller to the buyer and the payments of buyer to the seller. So, every 
state has particular CDS which are documented by International Swap and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA); the higher the CDS are the more risky the lending 
to this state is and the lower the CDS are the safer the lending to this state is (see 
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Ranciere, 2002). The CDS of many states are over 80 units, according to table 1, 
which means that is quite risky to lend to them.  
Table 1 
First instalment (2nd quarter 2010) 
Increase of Value Added Tax (VAT) 
 Increase of special consumption taxes in alcohol, cigarettes, fuels 
 Cut of 2 salaries annually in the public sector 
Reduction of public investments by 1.5 billion euro  
Pension system: increase of retirement age in 65 (from 63), minimum pension 360 
euro 
Second instalment (3rd quarter of 2010) 
Abolition of national and sectoral collective agreement 
Layoffs of civil servants, change in local administration system (fewer and larger 
regions, fewer and bigger municipalities) 
Liberalization of closed jobs (lawyers, engineers etc.) 
Third instalment (4th quarter 2010) 
More increase of VAT (23%) 
Abolition of weak public companies 
 
This situation was the main reason for the establishment of organizations like 
International Monetary Fund which lend money to states with the exchange of 
controlling their economy (see Cleaver, 1989). Actually, IMF interferes in a state 
due to very bad economic activity and not for political or economic factors (see 
Sturm et al., 2005). When economic and political factors are important, then the 
first ones affect the IMF credit while the second ones affect only the conclusions of 
IMF agreements. IMF has mechanical financial programs which are not always the 
best choice (see Easterly, 2006). 
The high national debts that occur in almost all the states, taking into account 
all the above procedure, depend on many factors and many times are not 
sustainable (see Leachman et al., 2007). However, the national debt could be 
characterized only as fake for the majority of the society and could not be separated 
to legal or illegal for example in cases of corruption. In current socioeconomic 
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system the debts evaluate the performance of a national economy, always in terms 
of capitalistic system; this is, in addition, a mechanism for new and harder measures 
which on the one hand deteriorate more the position of the workers and youths 
(see Moran, 1998) and on the other they contribute to the reproduction of the 
system.  
In an environment of crisis, the governments (acting as individual capitalists, 
theory of capitalist state see Jessop, 1982) adopt many times macroeconomic 
policies which are looser in order to increase money and credit supply in an effort 
to enhance economic demand (see Marx, 1885/1992). 
 
4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS 
The first consequences of current crisis started to appear in the beginning of 2008. 
In the sections below there is a separate examination of these consequences: one in 
international level and one in Greece. 
4.1 The consequences of crisis in international level 
Having already examined its structure, some of the reasons and some 
characteristics of the crisis, in this section, there will be an overview of crisis’ 
consequences in international level. This paper will deal with data3 regarding 
unemployment, wages, and growth.  
First of all, in the employment field, where there are the most important 
effects (see Dadkhah, 2009: 256), the world rate of unemployment after September 
2008 has been rocketed over. During 2009 (2010) the world unemployment rate 
broke the record, according to the annual report of International Labor 
Organization (ILO). The results of this report are impressive and have a real impact 
in our understanding of crisis’ effects in our life. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 All the data regarding unemployment and wages in this section are sourced by the annual reports of ILO and 
regarding growth and trade are sourced by the annual reports of OECD and World Bank. 
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Figure 1: Annual Growth of Worldwide Total GDP 
 
Source: Indexmundi (2011) 
 
In 2007 the unemployment people were 178 million, however in 2009 they 
increased to 212 million (34 million more), an increase of 19.1%.The world 
unemployment rate in 2008 was 7.2%, while in 2009 it increased to 8.7% and 
increased more, reaching almost 9% in 2010. Global youth unemployment rate rose 
by 1.6% to reach 13.4% in 2009 relatively to 2007, an increase of 10.2 million, the 
higher since 1991.  
According to ILO, the share of workers in vulnerable employment worldwide 
is estimated to reach over 1.5 billion, equivalent to over half (50.6%) of the world’s 
labor force. The number of women and men in vulnerable employment increased 
in 2009, by as much as 110 million compared to 2008. Finally, the total 
unemployment in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries was 6% in 2008, 8.1% in 2009 and 8.5% in 2010 showing that 
developed countries were affected more. 
The unemployment in 2010 is ranging from 4.4% in East Asia to more than 
10% in Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CSEE and CIS) as well as in North Africa. On contrary, the 
unemployment rate in the Developed Economies and EU jumped to 5.7% in 2007, 
6.0% in 2008, 8.4% in 2009 and 10% in 2010. In USA, where crisis began, the 
unemployment had a gradual increase (2007 6%, 2008 8% 2009 9.3% and 2010 
9.6%). The number of unemployed in the USA is estimated to have surged by more 
than 13.7 million between 2007 and 2009.  
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As for wages and incomes, the 2009 report of ILO, also, states that 633 million 
workers and their families were living on less than 1.25 US dollar per day in 2008, 
with 215 million more workers living on the margin and at risk of falling into 
poverty in 2009. This means a great increase of 33.9%. In addition, in USA in 2010 
the people who were living below poverty line were 49 million or 16.3% of total 
population according to the National Census Bureau (2011). According to Credit 
Suisse Wealth Report (2011) only the 0.5% of world population owns 38.5% of 
world wealth while t 8.2% owns 43.6%. Totally, 8.7% of total world population 
(almost only 610,000,000 people) owns 82.1% of total global wealth. 
Growth is the sector which shows that crisis has had higher impact on the 
developed world. Regarding Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate in 2009, for the 
first time in the post World War II era the global output growth was negative (-
2%). The total world annual growth in 2007 was 3.7%, in 2008 1.5% and in 2010 
4.5%. The real GDP growth in OECD countries was 2.7% in 2007, 0.3% in 2008, -
3.5% in 2009 and 2.9% in 2010. Finally, the world GDP per capita in 2008 was 
$11,000 whereas in 2009 it was $10,800 and $11,200 in 2010 (see CIA, 2010). 
Also, global trade plummeted 25% from 2008's level, the highest single year drop 
since World War II (see Dadkhah, 2009: 255). Among major countries, the biggest 
GDP losses in 2009 occurred in Russia (-8.5%), Mexico (-7.1%), Japan (-5.7%), 
Italy (-5%), and Germany (-5%), while China (+8.4%), India (+6.1%), and 
Indonesia (+4.4%) recorded the highest profits. In 2010 the highest GDP growth 
occurs in Qatar (16%), in Paraguay (15%) and in Singapore (14%) whereas the 
lowest in Greece (-4.5%), in Iceland (-3.5%) and in Madagascar (-1.9%). In this 
point it is indicated that the developed countries had the highest loses, while the 
developing ones continue their gradual increasing process. 
2010 is a year during which it is noticed a small recovery. However, the level 
of GDP did not reach the levels of pre-crisis period. Specifically, the growth of 
worldwide GDP in 2010 was 4.5% and there were some indicative examples of 
states (mainly big economies) with higher level of growth like China (10.1%), 
Taiwan (8.3%), India (8.3%) and Brazil (6.1%) (see Indexmundi, 2010). In USA, 
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GDP growth was 2.8% while in EU 1.7%. Within EU, the highest levels of positive 
growth were in Sweden (4.1%), Slovak Republic (4%) and Poland (3.6%) whereas 
Greece (-4.8%), Romania (-1.9%) and Latvia (-1.8%) had the highest negative 
growth. 
 
4.2 The consequences of crisis in Greece  
Greek state has borrowed huge amounts of money for all the reasons 
mentioned above. However, during the last 20 years, the situation has deteriorated. 
On the one hand Greek State (like the majority of developed ones) borrowed in 
order to finance Greek large companies (e.g. mega projects for the 2004-Olympic 
Games, the third most expensive Games ever that produced a 5-billion deficit) and 
the Greek military industry (Greece is a popular client of these industries by 
spending thousands of millions euro in armaments).  
On the other hand, and especially after 2006, Greek State increased the service 
of its debt (see Sakellaropoulos, 2010). Furthermore, in the last 20 years it created a 
real estate bubble (see Antzoulatos, 2011). At the same time, the vast majority of 
the upper class was engaged in a large scale tax evasion that was encouraged by the 
state. A very characteristic calculation claims that if the taxation of capital owners 
and companies was in the average of EU in the 2000-2008 period then the revenues 
of Greek state would have increased by 95 billion euro. All these resulted into an 
unprecedented increase of the budget deficit.  
Figure 2: Public surplus/deficit (% of National GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
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Greek economy was in bad condition in the last years something that can be 
shown from its public debt, considering that in current socioeconomic system the 
debts can show how bad the performance of a national economy is. So, Greek 
government decided to remain into Euro Zone and to go over the supportive 
mechanism established by both EU and IMF resulting in the hardest austerity 
measures and cuts in the period of parliamentary democracy in Greece (after 1974). 
The Greek rate of deficit in period of 2000-2003 is one of the highest in EU 
(see Eurostat, 2011). 2004, the “Olympic year”, was very important for Greek 
economy: this mega-event had been targeted as the basis for the beginning of a new 
era of growth. However, it had never had the expected benefits. On contrary, it 
contributed with 5 billion euro deficit increasing the public deficit in -7.5% (2004). 
After 2004, Greek rate of deficit slightly decreased before being the highest in EU 
for the years in the row (2007, 2008, and 2009), a situation which indicates the huge 
negative effects that global economic crisis had on Greek economy revealing the 
previous bad performance in the most emphatic way.  
In 2009, the deficit was -14.3% of GDP (see ELSTAT, 2011). Except Greece, 
the other economies that faced big problems at that period (and either have 
recourse to supportive mechanism of IMF or not) had very high rates of deficit in 
total GDP (like Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Latvia). Even in absolute numbers the 
Greek deficit was extremely high being in the 6th place in EU27 lower only than the 
5 big-size economies of the Union (Germany, France, Spain, Italy, UK) and higher 
than bigger economies like the Netherlands (see Eurostat, 2011) (Greek is a 
medium-size). 
As it concerns Greek Government debt from 2000 until 2007 it had wild 
fluctuations as it is shown in Figure 2; from this year it started to increase until 2010 
when it rocketed up to 144% of GDP. Greek debt increased so much due to the 
increased loans of Greek economy in order to refinance its older debt, to repay the 
interests of older loans and to finance companies and the development projects 
which were very expensive (Olympic Games). 
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Figure 3: General Government Debt (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
Global economic crisis had a very negative effect in Greece, like in the most 
developed states, increasing the level of interest rates in the “markets” at 6% 
(March 2010) since they did not trust, yet, this state as a guarantor (CDS in 2009 
were 200 while in January of 2011 they were 915). 
Figure 4: Annual Unemployment Rate in Greece 
 
Source: ELSTAT (2011) 
 
Unemployment in last decade, according to Figure 4, had some fluctuations 
between 8% and 10% reaching 7.7% in 2008. After 2008 the situation deteriorated. 
Crisis increased, initially, unemployment rate in 9.5% (2009). In addition, the 
austerity measures and cuts of 2010 largely increased unemployment in 14.8% 
(2010). So, crisis and government decisions (in coordination with EU and IMF) 
seem that they were catastrophic for workers and youth (youth unemployment 
according to ELSTAT is almost 30% in 2010). According to ILO, 25% (2,800,000 
persons) of total population in Greece lives below poverty line. 
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Finally, Greece’s introduction in Euro Zone (2001) seems that did not result in the 
expected goals in growth. After 2003, when GDP increased 5.9%, it began its 
decline as the data show in Figure 5. After 2007 its decrease became higher: 2% 
(2008), -2% (2009) and -3.8% (2010). 
Figure 5: Real Greek GDP growth 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
5. THE STATE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
In front of all these consequences states had to react through specific 
policies in order to face them. The real question is related to the way that the 
states reacted, which were the policies, which were the goals and who did 
they aim to protect and benefit.  
 
5.1 The response in international level 
All the states had the incentive to react in a single way to face crisis aiming at 
an integrated solution of the problems that crisis created. After the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers there were many plans like Bolson plan (American plan of 
recovery and re-investment) and meetings like this of the 20 most powerful 
economies of the world (G20). Of course, there were also measures from many 
states but it was always asked an integrated way in order to reduce crisis’ duration 
and length. 
These plans had as main characteristic not only the ignorance of workers and 
youth but a huge attack against them, deteriorating their position and their living 
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standards and reducing their rights. These policies were structured for supporting 
and saving (therefore to have again the same increasing profit rate) the banks and 
the big multinational corporations. So, in USA Bolson plan (see Zandi, 2009), was 
approved in February 2009 and put into the market 700 billion dollars, the big 
majority of which were intended for the banks that have been affected the most by 
the crisis. In EU, a similar plan introduced into the market 200 billion dollars. A 
characteristic case of such a plan was Greece which government subsidized banks 
(only in 2008) with 28 billion euro. 
General spirit of these policies was stigmatized by the efforts to save the 
system (capitalism) and its pillars (banks). The combination of huge cuts in public 
expenditures, salaries and public investments and of the big increase of layoffs was 
the basis of the plan that would save the system. ILO data show 34 million 
unemployed persons increase, worldwide, only in 1.5 year (middle of 2008 to end of 
2010). 
Formal state political reactions did not focus on the real affected social groups 
of crisis (employees, unemployed, youth) but on banks and private firms which 
caused the crisis (see Harvey, 2010). And yet, finally they did not have the expected 
results, even for improving banks’ position. After these initial measures, the 
governments obligated to implement more and harder measures (analyzed below). 
State policies seemed unable to react efficiently due to the creation of an 
uncontrolled trap of liquidity, especially if they did not proceed in even harder 
measures against the majority of society (see Radice, 2011). 
 
5.2 The response of Greek Government 
The response to crisis which, as shown above, affected in an extremely high 
rate Greece was a big priority in the agenda of Greek governments. The effort 
made in order to face crisis can be divided in 2 parts: period from August 2008 
(that the first results of crisis occurred) to May 2010 (that Greece introduced into 
supportive mechanism of EU and IMF) and from May 2010 since today. 
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5.2.1 First Period: August 2008 – May 2010 
The first reactions of then Greek government, after the first appearance of 
crisis consequences, occurred by the suggestions of EU (see Kathimerini, 2008a) 
and the agreement in central level for the protection and financial support to the 
banks. So, the first decision of Greek government was to subsidize Greek banks 
with 28 billion euro. This decision was made by the parliament in November 2008 
mentioning that the banks would receive special public bonds with zero interest 
rate for the banks with a fee of 25-50 units of basis of total value 8 billion euro, 
increase of share capital 5 billion euro and 15 billion euro direct guarantee (see 
Papadogiannis, 2008). However, the firms of broader private sector became 
skeptical to this huge amount to the banks since they were doubtful regarding the 
banks possible or not provision of money for the support and stimulation of 
economy (see Mpourdaras, 2008). 
This action took place in spite of the fact that the profits of Greek banks were 
huge during the previous years (1.7 billion euro for Ethniki Bank, 851 million euro 
for Eurobank, 844 for Alpha Bank) (see Bankingnews, 2011). However, as it is 
indicated below and despite the support that banking sector received it never 
recovered and continued its downward trend. 
In this period, there have never been measures for stimulating employment, 
development, and infrastructure not even in the perspective of Keynesianism (see 
Krugman, 2009) and welfare state which is a situation very seldom occurred in 
current global system. So, recovery plans focused on benefiting the banks and big 
firms while the layoffs were increasing continually. In 4th October 2009 the 
government changed in the national elections and the right-wing neoliberal part was 
preplaced by the social-democratic party. However, the policy did not change 
neither in the second period, when the situation in Greece worsened due to these 
policies.  
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5.2.2 Second period: May 2010 - today 
Initial measures that Greek government decided were not efficient (referring 
always to the banks since these measures were very efficient in the deterioration of 
living standards of the majority of society): according to Figure 5, in 2009 growth 
rate decreased (-3.3%), unemployment increased, as it is shown in Figure 6, but 
mainly both general government debt and public deficit increased rapidly. So, the 
situation of Greek economy was deteriorating, society was diving into poverty and 
vassalage and the situation and atmosphere in the country was very bad. 
Figure 6: Unemployment in Greece per quarter 
 
 Source: ELSTAT (2011) 
The performance of Greek Economy and the continuous increase of debt resulted 
in a rapid increase of the interest rates for borrowing to Greece from the markets. 
As a result, Greece could not borrow from markets or it could, but with very bad 
terms (very high interest rate). Then, the government turned to the solution of 
International Monetary Fund which established a supportive mechanism with EU 
for supporting Greek economy (see Kouretas and Vlamis, 2010). So, in May 2010 
the introduction of Greece into the supportive mechanism was announced, in a 
period that the rumors of possible bail out increased. This supportive mechanism 
promised to Greece a loan of 110 billion euro (see Zahariadis, 2010).  
The exchange for this loan was the very hard austerity measures and cuts that 
were voted in the parliament by the suggestions of IMF and EU. These measures 
were agreed in the First Memorandum between Greece and EU-IMF. Greek State 
 22 
started receiving the loan installments and delivered the control of political and 
economical process to IMF and EU. Greek government decided to choose the path 
within Euro Zone in order to face debt crisis, remaining into Euro Zone but largely 
reducing the living standards of Greek citizens. 
These measures began to be applied in May of 2010 with the vote in the 
parliament of the First Memorandum which until 2015 would be equal with cuts of 
30 billion euro (in 2010 5.8 billion) and which were supposed (according to the 
commitments of the government) to be the only measures. So, the initial agreement 
was that in each installment of the huge loan no new measures would be necessary. 
But this was not the truth as the history showed. In reality, these measures were not 
constantly but they would be renewed each time that Greek government was 
supposed to receive the installments of the loan.  
These measures, initially, aimed at saving 2.5% of GDP in 2010 for the 
reduction of the debt and the increase of revenues by 4$ of GDP in 2013. 
However, in the evaluation for the 2nd installment (for the third quarter of 2010) the 
goals changed: the goal was to reduce the deficit to 7.8% for 2010 instead of 8.1% 
in the beginning of the Memorandum (finally it was 9.9%). Great impression is 
caused by the hardness of the measures against workers and youth, the only who 
someone cannot blame for crisis creation. The basic measures of First 
Memorandum which duration was until the beginning of 2011 are shown in table 2.  
A basic element of these measures is that they applied to all the fields and sectors 
of socio-economic process. The demand for change by the supporters (IMF, EU) 
was so big that Greek government had to interfere to all these fields. Secondly, the 
abolition of the collective agreements shows the incentive of the State to establish 
one situation that individual negotiations with the employers were the only solution 
for the employees. Also, one of the most basic elements of this policy was the 
second subsidy to the banks, bigger than the first (30 billion euro). The aim was 
their support for the provision of liquidity to the society which had never come 
from the first subsidy (see Eleftherotypia, 2011). The goals of the austerity 
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measures and budget cuts were never achieved not due to the inability of the Greek 
government but due to the nature of these measures. 
Table 2 
 
 
So, the measures (as it is shown better below) did not attribute and new ones had to 
be decided. In 29th June 2011 Greek Parliament voted the Medium Term Financial 
Strategy Framework which was determining the economic policy of Greek State 
until 2015. Greek government, ignoring the Constitution, decided Greek economic 
policy for a period after the end of its service.  
This new collection of laws was validating all the measures which were 
mentioned above and in addition: 1 recruitment for each 10 retirements or 
dismissals in public sector for 2011 and 1 for 5 until 2015, increase of weekly 
working hours of civil servants from 37.5 to 40, larger decline of pensions (20% 
monthly) and salaries, decline of tax rates, imposition of special solidarity financial 
contribution for individuals, increase of the tax of real estate, more increase in the 
tax of smoke, more dismissals in public sector and finally privatization of state 
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property (valued 50 billion euro) until 2015 with most characteristic examples this 
of Public Telecommunications Company, the Public Electricity Company, the big 
ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki and the international airport of Athens (see 
Greek Republic, 2011). In this way the Greek state ensured the 4th installment. 
All these new and harder measures were the guarantee for the agreement of 21st 
July in the council of EU which referred to 21% cut of Greek debt (see Council of 
EU, 2011a), a new program of a loan valued 109 billion together with IMF and a 
new development program for Greece called as a “New Marshal Plan”. This meant 
in the reality the cut of 26 billion euro of Greek debt (only the 7%) and the 
exchange of the bonds that were expiring in 2012-2015 period with new that expire 
after 15-30 years resulting in a situation of “selective default” as the Credit Rating 
Agencies claimed (see Varoufakis, 2011a). After this decision the Greek state 
received the 5th installment of the loan. 
However this cut, by the exchange of national bonds, referred to a volunteering 
participation of the private sector and until October 2011 the procedure had not 
been completed (almost not even started). There were new pressures for new 
measures since the old ones were not efficient and the agreement of 21st July could 
not be applied. Greek government voted another law in 20th October that was 
regulating new and very hard rules for the Greek public sector: 30,000 “indirect” 
dismissals i.e. these public servants are getting into redundancy scheme (reserve) for 
2 years and receive only the 60% of the basic wage and after they get retired or they 
are fired, all the basic subsidies are abolished, minimum wage of 780 euro. This law 
did not ensure the 6th installment (8 billion euro) for Greece. 
6 days later, in 26th October the Council of EU decided for Greece a new 
voluntary 50% haircut of pre-May 2010 bonds that have not been matured yet 
setting as goal for the debt reducing to 120% of GDP in 2020, a new loan 100 
billion euro from EU, ECB (European Central Bank) and IMF to Greece and 30 
billion financial guarantee for the participation of private sector (PSI) in order to 
participate to the voluntary haircut (see Council of EU, 2011b). This was decided 
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after hours of negotiations between German Chancellor Merkel, French President 
Sarkozy and the bankers.  
This new program will be accompanied by new and harder austerity measures. 
So, in the same time that the debt haircut is 50% and the officials speak about 100 
billion debt cut, a new loan of 100 billion and 30 billion of financial guarantees are 
decided resulting in a negative result for Greece in macro terms. Even the direct 
effect is not positive. In the best case we refer to a 19% haircut of Greek debt, 
which is, probably, not going to decline in the levels of EU Council’s goals and it 
cannot be less than 140% in 2020 (see Varoufakis, 2011b). 
However, this decision is not ensured since the private sector did not respond 
in a satisfying way in the previous debt haircut. Probably the real cut will be much 
smaller. These decisions obligate Greece for new negotiations with private sector 
and harder measures which are supposed to be decided by a new government. The 
government majority was disputed through the continuous votes of hard measures 
in the parliament and an agreement occurred, without elections but after 
negotiations, for government coalition between the two big parties: social 
democrats and neoliberals together with extreme right wing party. The new prime 
minister of Greece is a top-banker, former vice president of ECB for 8 years.  
 
6. THE RESULTS OF STATE POLICIES IN GREECE 
 The most important issue is to evaluate the results of the policies based on 
their main goals and the total spirit that they had. In case of Greece it is considered 
that the most suitable indicators are three: growth rate and government debt as the 
main goals that had been set and unemployment rate from the social perspective of 
the Memorandums. 
 Overcoming the recession was important for Memorandum. The predicted 
level regarding the real GDP growth was -4% for 2010 (see European Commission, 
2010) and the data showed, after many revisions, that it was -3.5% (see ELSTAT, 
2011). The goal for 2011 was -2.6% but probably it will not reach it. The data per 
quarter of 2010 and the 3 first quarters of 2011 (compared to the same quarter of 
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previous year) of Figure 7 show that Greek economy was in real recession and 
Memorandum largely contributed in this since the situation deteriorated as time 
passed. Furthermore, the fact that Greece had still the lowest growth rate in EU 
show that this goal has never been reached; on contrary Memorandum aggravated 
the situation. Finally, Greece in 2012 will be the only state that after World War II 
is in recession (according to predictions of National Budget) for 5 years in the row. 
Figure 7: Real GDP Growth Rate 2010 
 
  Source: ELSTAT (2011) 
The main goal of the Program was to “restore Greece’s credibility for private 
investors” with an initial goal to lend from the markets in 2012 (see European 
Commission, 2010) which is now considered as quite difficult –many say that even 
not in 2020 it will be made (see Varoufakis, 2011b). In the end of 2009 national 
debt was almost 120% of GDP and the goal of the Memorandum for 2010 was 
133% (see European Commission, 2010). However, general government debt was 
144% of GDP finally in 2010 and 153% in March of 2011 (see ELSTAT, 2011). In 
Figure 8 it is shown its evolution in 2010 per quarter in absolute numbers.  
The same evolution is noticed, also, in deficit: in 2009 it was -14.3% of GDP and 
the goal for 2010 was set in 8.1% (see European Commission, 2010). Finally, the 
public deficit in Greece for 2010 was -9.9% of GDP. So, it is considered that the 
basic goal of Memorandum for 2010 had failed. 
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Figure 8: Evolution of government debt 2010 
 
  Source: Greek Ministry of Finance (2011a) 
Employment is a field that there had never been any efforts neither to be protected 
nor to recover by Greek governments in 2008-2011, but which on contrary was 
targeted to be hurt proceeding in thousands of layoffs in public sector and allowing 
and preparing the background for even more layoffs in private one, retaining the 
recession and obligating many mainly small and weak firms to close.  
 Between May 2010 and May 2011 (one year of Memorandum) the 
employment decreased by 1.24% and the unemployment increased by 36%: 
299,798 less employed persons and 220,534 more unemployed ones (see ELSTAT, 
2011). In Figure 9 it is shown that unemployment had continually increasing rate 
showing an increase of almost 0.5% each month in this period. So, from the 11.6% 
of June 2010 (only one month after the implementation of Memorandum) 
unemployment reached 16.2% in March 2011 and 18.4% in August 2011.  
 Youth unemployment in the first quarter of 2011 has increased extremely in 
30.9% from the 22.3% in the same quarter in 2010 (see ELSTAT, 2011). Totally, 
from September 2008 that crisis results began to appear in EU until August 2011 
the unemployed persons increased by 544,084 new individuals in Greece, an 
increase of 149.5%.  
 According to Bank of Greece, more than 500,000 individuals (12.9% of total 
population for 2011 fro, 9.8% in 2010) in Greece lived without any income in the 
first half of 2011 since they were members of family that nobody was employed. 
Also, the average gross earnings declined 9.1% in 2010 and 6.3% in 2011.  
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Figure 9: Unemployment in 2010 and 2011 
 
 Source: ELSTAT (2011) 
All these measures were decided in a period that the arm expenditures in Greece 
are extremely high: arm expenditures’ share in national GDP is the highest in EU in 
the 9 years of the last decade that data are available (see SIPRI, 2011). Another very 
interesting point is that the countries that sell weapons to Greece in the highest rate 
are USA, Germany, France and the Netherlands, as it is shown in Table 3. So, these 
states borrow to Greece to repay its debt, to support tha banks and to pay weapons 
from their arm industries. In addition, in the same time of the 30,000 dismissals of 
civil servants and of the rule 1 recruitment to 10 dismissals, the Greek State recruits 
1,200 new police guards (see Kathimerini, 2011). 
Table 3  
National Budget 2011 million euro 
Revenues 59,482 
Primary Expenditures (wages, pensions, etc.) 55,633 
Primary Surplus 3,849 
Interests for previous debt 15,920 
Arm programs 1,600 
Activation of guarantees 1,196 
Total Secondary Expenditures 18,716 
Total Deficit -14,867 
 
Finally, the tax measures that were promoted had shown in an emphatic way which 
part of society would pay for crisis. According to data from the General 
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Commission of Information Systems (2011), the percentage of the participation 
rate of employees and pensioners, increased gradually until 2007; after 2007 it had 
an important increase and it was the only which increased from 2009 to 2010 (from 
52.59% to 55.54%). The contribution of firms had a downward behavior since 
2006 and they largely declined after the new measures of Greek government while 
the contribution of self employed was increasing until 2008 when it began to 
decline (from 16.62% to 15.79% the self employed and from 30.79% to 28.67% the 
firms). The new measures worsen the situation of high tax evasion of the higher 
social stratums. 
 Nowadays, it is more obvious than ever that in the effort of the state to 
overcome financial and debt crisis, specifically in Greece, it takes place a very hard 
policy for workers and youth (see Lapavitsas, 2010), in an effort to pay for the crisis 
and the debt the people who did not cause it and in a very doubtful process of 
stimulating economy (see Sakellaropoulos, 2010). Workers and youth are the real 
largely negatively affected subjects from the response of state against crisis whereas 
the benefited ones are the banks and the private enterprises. It is indicated that in 
Greece, as in every state that IMF interferes (see Moran, 1998), the socio-economic 
situation and well being of societal majority deteriorated rapidly (see Panas, 2011). 
In addition, such policies of internal devaluation during crisis have failed to support 
growth but on contrary enhance and deepen recession. This claim has been verified 
in many cases with most recent example, except Greece, this of Latvia (see 
Weisbrot and Ray, 2011). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
An integrated research for crisis’ consequences in Greece, the policies for facing 
them and the evaluation and results of them was the core topic of this paper. Crisis, 
an inherent characteristic of capitalism, in its current form presents very significant 
characteristics. Its consequences are huge and obvious on every field of human life 
and mainly on employment, growth, wages and public deficits and government 
debts. 
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Current crisis in Greece has been also converted to “debt crisis” and “crisis of 
competitiveness”. So, we are in front of a situation that Greek State policies (and 
policies of the majority of the states) are a part of a cycle which is summarized in: 
“growth-crisis-debt increase-competitiveness decline-financial austerity measures 
and cuts”. This cycle ends often with these policies that promote the specific 
measures which hurt only the workers and youth. This whole procedure results in 
the situation that the part of the society which finally pays for the crisis and the 
debt (workers) is this which did not cause it. 
The reaction to crisis had in its core the protection of capital (in Greece totally 
in this period 140 billion euro were offered to the banks, cuts in the wages for 
increasing profit rate) and in no case of the people and of the employment which 
were not only neglected but targeted in a negative way and were sacrificed at the 
altar of capital and its salvation. The consequences were catastrophic: huge 
unemployment, wage and living standards declined dramatically, big increase of 
rich-poor gap, 25% of population now lives under poverty line, and high reduce of 
bank savings (see ELSTAT, 2011).  
However, despite the measures aimed at saving and overcoming Greek 
economy and growth, this has never happened until now resulting in faster increase 
of debt and deficit and faster and more negative growth. In the same time, in 
Greece the social background is a nightmare for the Greek government with the 
majority of the people on the streets demonstrating their reaction to all these. Debt, 
which is inherent to capitalism, is not a self-reliant financial problem of a 
government or a state but it is mainly political issue which cannot be faced in a 
technical or economical way. 
Examining the whole reaction of states and organizations it could be said that 
the sovereign state policy has weakened a lot in favor of the strength and decisive 
ability of EU. Moving in this direction, it could be added that within EU there are 
dominant players (core Member States like Germany, France, the Netherlands) who 
largely participate in the decision making for the whole EU and for policies in 
specific Member States (especially the periphery ones like Greece, Spain, Ireland). 
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EU role is quite important and the most of the decisions regarding specific Member 
States and national policies are made in Brussels (EU headquarters) and all of them 
are following the Treaties and Directives of EU.  
So, the procedure regarding debt crisis until now within EU seems like a cycle: 
the money of the Greek national budget are more than adequate for public wages 
and pensions but not for paying off older loans and interest and for enhancing its 
banks: the net revenues are 59,482 billion euro and the expenditures for wages and 
pensions were 19,802, -2% comparing to 2010 (Greek Ministry of Finance, 2011b).  
For this reason Greece had to borrow in order to repay the debt and its interests 
(16 billion euro) that was caused by upper class tax evasion, finance to big 
companies, organizing Olympic Games, very high rate of exchange when Greece 
joined Euro Zone (see Lapavitsas, 2010). So, primarily there is surplus while taking 
into account the secondary financial obligations the total deficit is 14,867 million 
euro.  
This situation worsened during crisis and Greece could not borrow from 
markets. EU and IMF were willing to help: European tax payers are paying more 
and more for the loans to Greece. But all this money is provided to banks in order 
to be safe and of course not to the Greek people’s pockets. Greek citizens live 
within austerity, obligated to work more and more in order to contribute for the 
national refinance of the current and older loans.   
In this way, it becomes obvious that main goal of state policies (under EU 
directives) was (and still is) to protect the subjects which created this crisis (capital, 
banks, big firms) and to hurt the workers and the youth who did not cause but 
finally pay for this crisis. State response to crisis eliminated the extremely few signs 
of welfare state that existed in Greece and increased the inequalities. Crisis itself 
was both the excuse, the cause but also the opportunity for the creation of this very 
sad situation. The opposition and reaction of people and societies to this reality 
constitutes a big challenge for them in order to change their lives. 
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